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Abstract 
This paper examines the interrelation between short selling and volatility as differing from 
previous research in that it focuses on intraday activities rather than the daily price 
movements. We demonstrate that the effects of short selling activity changes during the two 
sessions of the day and rest of trading hours. The study also presents evidence that there is a 
considerable amount of short selling activity in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), 
particularly at the beginning of opening sessions, which significantly impacts the volatility of 
the market for the rest of the trading day.  
Keywords: Short selling, Istanbul Stock Exchange, Intraday volatility, market efficiency, 
financial crises 
JEL classification: G01, G14, G15 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the relationship between intraday short selling activities and volatility, 
as offering a different perspective from the previous literature by including high frequency 
intraday data to measure the relationship between volatility and short selling. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study which examines the effect of intraday short selling 
activities on stock returns as regards the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
 
During the global financial crisis, the limitations of short selling activities attracted 
considerable attention. As in most financial crises, regulators imposed short selling bans 
throughout the world. Fear on behalf of investors triggered large scale shorting activities 
which drove down stock prices and resulted in a loss of confidence in financial markets. This 
loss of confidence spread to other countries and consequently resulted in a contagious 
restriction on short selling activities for various time periods (Mackintosh et al. 2009). 
Surprisingly, however, no restrictions were imposed on shorting activities in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange.  
 
There is a vast body of related literature assessing the impact of such restrictions (Bris et al. 
2007).   However, little attention has been given to the impact of intraday short selling 
activities on stocks’ return volatility (Aitken et al., 1998; Shilko et al., 2008; Boehmer & Wu, 
2010), and studies on short selling activities have primarily focused on a daily basis. The 
related research concerning these models will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on short 
selling, with particular attention on the regulation and suspension of short selling activities. 
This section also offers up an analysis of the related literature which examines the relations 
among volume-return-liquidity activities. Section 3 provides details about the data set used 
and the econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and section 5 
concludes.  
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The selling of securities that one does not actually own has long been a cryptic issue for 
market participants, especially for investors but also for regulators and academics. 
Throughout the related literature, short sellers are assumed to be rational, informed market 
players whose actions move prices back to fundamentals (Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), 
Lamont and Thaler (2003), Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007)). This debate is not new to 
market participants. Gruenewald et al. (2010) points out that the first legislation against short 
selling was enacted on February 24, 1610. From time to time, short sellers have been 
considered to be the “good guys,” as expressed by Boehmer et al. (2009) and conversely 
targeted as “scapegoats,” particularly during times of financial turmoil. The most recent 2008 
ban on naked short selling enacted by US and UK regulators was no different in this regard, 
and most Western European countries followed the precedent laid down by the interventions 
enacted in the US and UK. However, a notable point about these restrictions is that they were 
limited solely to financial sector stocks in western countries; in contrast, the measures 
implemented in Asian and Australian markets primarily targeted all listed companies. It is 
also worthy of note that during this period of global market turmoil, no short selling ban was 
implemented in the Istanbul Stock Exchange, even for naked short selling.    
 
Supporters of short selling argue that if short selling were prohibited, prices would not 
accurately reflect all of the relevant information. This argument posits that short selling thus 
does not increase the volatility of the stock market, but on the contrary it acts as a stabilizer 
for financial markets. Angel (1997) claims that it is not short sale orders but rather ordinary 
orders which render the market more volatile. A number of papers have analyzed the effects 
of temporary restrictions which were implemented in various markets in September of 2008. 
Bris et al. (2008) studied the changes in stock prices, the rate of short sales, the aggressiveness 
of short sellers, and various liquidity measures before, during, and after the shorting ban in the 
US. They compared the banned stocks with a control group of non-banned stocks and found 
that the shorting ban caused a severe degradation in market quality, as measured by spreads, 
price impacts, and intraday volatility.  
 
The results of a UK study undertaken by FSA (Financial Services Authority) in 2009 
demonstrated that volatility for stocks which were placed under a temporary short selling ban 
in September 2008 was “substantially higher than for shares in the FTSE 350 in general.” In 
addition, volume, which is an important measure of liquidity, showed a significant decline. 
When compared with the 90-day period prior to the ban, volume decreased 36% in contrast to 
trading volume which fell 11%. A similar study by Clifton and Snape (2008) commissioned 
by the London Stock Exchange compared the FTSE 100 companies which are subject to 
prohibition with a control sample of FTSE 100 securities which fall outside the scope of 
prohibition. They found evidence of wider bid-offer spreads, less market depth and reduced 
liquidity for the UK shares subject to the shorting ban.  
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In another study conducted by a regulatory authority, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission (2009), the short selling patterns in the Hong Kong market were analyzed for the 
years spanning between 2005 and 2008. They concluded that trading volume rose as short 
selling increased and that short selling improved market efficiency. They also found that short 
selling activities contribute to tighter bid-ask spreads. 
According to Miller (1977), stocks are overvalued in the presence of short-sale constraints, 
and the subsequent negative abnormal returns represent a correction of this overvaluation. 
Apart from the overvaluation hypothesis, Akbas et al. (2008) focused on the information 
hypothesis and proposed that short sellers act as specialized monitors who generate value-
relevant information in the stock market. Saffi & Sigurdsson (2011) also claim that short 
sellers can “correct” market prices and effectively neutralize “irrational exuberance” in the 
economy. Saffi & Sigurdsson (2011) used a global data set including 12,600 stocks from 26 
countries between 2005 and 2008 to show that stocks with higher short-sale constraints, as 
measured in terms of low lending supply, have a lower price efficiency.  
Charoenrook and Daouk (2009) reported that when short selling is possible, aggregate stock 
returns are less volatile and there is greater liquidity. In other words, they suggest that 
allowing short sales improves market quality. Marsh and Niemer (2008) summarized their 
findings under four headings: First, they found no strong evidence that restrictions on short 
selling changed the behavior of stock returns. Second, they compared trading behavior among 
countries and found no systematic patterns consistent with the effect of the new regulations. 
They also found no sign of a detrimental impact of the constraints in terms of reduced 
efficiency of pricing. Last but not least, their regression analysis suggested that changes in 
stock returns were driven mainly by other factors affecting the financial sector rather than 
restrictions on short selling.  
 
Opponents of short selling have argued that constraints on short selling reduce market 
efficiency and price discovery, and may in fact destabilize markets (Allen and Gale, 1991). 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) explore the effects of short sales constraints on the speed of 
price-adjustments resulting from private information regarding security prices. They found 
that prohibiting traders from shorting reduces the adjustment speed of prices in reaction to 
private information, especially to bad news. Aitken et al. (1998) used intraday short sale data 
from the Australian Stock Exchange and examined the price reaction to short sales and found 
that abnormal returns decrease almost immediately after a short sale. Diether et al. (2007) 
showed that short sellers trade on short-term overreaction to stock returns. Blau et al.’s (2009) 
findings were also consistent with Diether et al. (2007); they claimed that there is a negative 
relation between short activity and future intraday returns on down days. Shkilko et al. (2008) 
also argue that during intraday liquidity crises, short selling can destabilize the prices. 
Desai et al. (2002) analyzed the level of short interest and returns. They found that increases 
in the level of short interest actually decrease returns for NASDAQ stocks, and they also 
found that heavily shorted stocks experience negative returns. Henry and McKenzie (2006) 
also noted that short selling has a significant impact on volatility and volume in the Hong 
Kong market. It should be pointed out, however, that their results indicate that short selling 
causes an asymmetric response to positive and negative innovations on returns. Additionally, 
the Hong Kong market displays greater volatility after a period of short selling. 
 
Boehmer et al.’s (2008) findings indicate that on average short sellers are important 
contributors to efficient stock prices. In their study, they used short sale transaction data from 
the period of the 2008 short sale ban period in the US. They found that when the shorting ban 
was in effect, market quality measures deviated more significantly, and stocks that are lightly 
shorted outperformed heavily shorted stocks.   
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Bai, Chang and Wang (2006) claim that constraining short sales impedes informed trades and 
that over time, asset prices do not reflect all of the available information. According to their 
model, this constraint on short selling causes asset prices to fall and consequently leads to 
lower equilibrium prices. A theoretical work by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) showed that short sales constraints can be the direct cause of, 
or at least a necessary condition for, bubble formation and excessive volatility. A more recent 
work by Bris et al. (2007) analyzed cross-sectional and time series information from forty-six 
markets around the world and found that prices incorporate negative information more 
quickly in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. They also found that when 
short selling is prohibited, market returns display significantly less negative skewness.   
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study utilizes a 28-month sample period which starts at the beginning of September 2007 
and ends at the close of 2009. 15-minute intraday return values of the ISE-100 index were 
formed by averaging historical ten second tick data. The tick data for the entire period as well 
as trading volumes, short selling volumes and short selling quantities were obtained directly 
from the ISE.  The sample period consists of 575 trading days; holidays and days when the 
markets were closed for other reasons have been excluded from the data. 
Before discussing the details of the methodology, it will be helpful to overview the short 
selling regulations for the Istanbul Stock Exchange. If naked short selling,
1
 which is permitted 
in the ISE, is covered intraday, nothing remains to be done, as settlement is done on a netting 
basis on T+2. If the short-sale is not covered on the transaction date, the short-selling party 
must borrow equities either from the OTC market or from the Securities Lending and 
Borrowing Market and cover its settlement obligation on T+2. In case of settlement failures, if 
a party fails to meet its obligations by 16:00 on T+2, it is considered as having failed. Market 
members have the option to settle their dues by 09:30 on T+3 by paying a default penalty 
interest (Fikirkoca, 2009).    
The 15-minute mean returns are calculated with formula (1) and intraday 15-minute classical 
volatility is measured with standard deviation formula (2): 
       (1) 
         (2) 
where pt is the Composite Index at time t and pt-1 is the index observed fifteen minutes before. 
The generalized volatility for the time horizon T is expressed in Equation 2. 
In addition to the classical volatility measure of standard deviation we also used volatility 
measures such as those developed by Rogers & Satchell (1991) and Yang and Zhang (2002). 
These methods use information on daily trading ranges such as intraday high and low prices 
of assets. Yang & Zhang (YZ) is an extension of the Garman & Klass (1980) estimator and it 
is independent of process drift and opening gaps. The main difference between the two 
methods is that the GK estimator only uses three items of price information, namely high, low 
                                                          
1 Naked short selling is often used for intraday trading, where the position is opened and then closed at some point later in the 
day. In an FSA discussion paper, naked short selling is defined in the following manner: “In a naked short sale, the seller sells 
shares they do not own, without having set aside any shares to settle the transaction.” 
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and close prices to estimate volatility. However, in addition to the current high, low and close 
prices in GK, the YZ extension also uses the opening price. The main purpose of this 
estimator is to capture the effects of opening jumps during session openings. In the ISE, there 
is a break at noon for one hour and 45 minutes. This estimator, given in formula (3) below, 
aims to capture information accumulated during periods of closure:    
      (3) 
The next volatility estimator is Rogers & Satchell (RS) which outperforms other estimators 
when the asset process includes a time-varying drift (Rogers et al., 1994). The main difference 
between YZ and RS is that the latter does not account for price jumps and assumes no 
opening jump. The RS historical volatility estimator primarily allows for non-zero drift, but 
assumes no opening jumps. 
       (4) 
In this study, we employ YZ and RS estimators for three time periods. First, the daily 
calculations are performed using both estimators. Basically, the daily estimators use the close 
value as the prior day’s closing value of the ISE 100 Index, opening as the opening value of 
the Index on that specific day, and low and high values represent the minimum and maximum 
values for the whole trading day. The same methodology is employed for the morning and 
afternoon sessions in a similar manner. In the morning session, the estimators use the opening 
value as first session’s opening value, closing as the closing value of the first session on that 
specific day, and low and high values represent the minimum and maximum values for the 
first session of the trading day. Similarly, for the afternoon session, estimators use the 
opening value as the second session’s opening value, closing as the closing value in the 
second session on that specific day, and low and high values represent the minimum and 
maximum values for the second session of the trading day.  
Table 1 
The table shows the selected descriptive statistic results for Short Selling Volume(SSV), Short Selling 
Quantity(SSQ), and RS and YZ estimators for Daily-Morning-Afternoon sessions.  
  DAILY MORNING AFTERNOON 
  SSV SSQ RS YZ SSV SSQ RS YZ SSV SSQ RS YZ 
 Mean 90370831 33034657  0.007330  0.000247 61276923 22416290  0.004407  0.000137 29093907 10618367  0.004996  7.11E-05 
 Median 83958036 30785509  0.006711  0.000106 55598502 20404063  0.004057  5.87E-05 26659507  9825427.  0.004428  3.81E-05 
 Std. Dev. 34965569 15216635  0.004388  0.000414 25874472 11087427  0.002813  0.000312 13007847  5266208.  0.003265  0.000101 
 Skewness  0.671707  0.587358 1.637494 4.654387  0.687024  0.660318 2.016881 7.440955 1.032526  0.950697 1.149248 4.334237 
 Kurtosis 3.123261 2.695320 9.526418 31.61971 3.162770 2.824228 12.72354 78.64055 4.368353 3.848057 5.057337 28.19336 
 Jarque-Bera 43.60303 35.28556 1277.45  21700.04 45.86829 42.52549 2655.024  142383.5 147.0282 103.8474 227.9807  17006.77 
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 
 
All of the series display positive skewness, implying that the distribution has a long right tail. 
In particular, when the RS and YZ estimators are compared, it can be seen that YZ has a 
stronger skewness for all three time periods when compared to the RS estimator. RS has 
higher Kurtosis values than YZ except for the morning section. All distributions exhibit 
significant deviations from normality at the 5% level as seen from the reported Jarque-Bera 
test statistics.  
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Figure 1 
15-Minute Volatility Using YZ 
 
 
Figure 2 
15-Minute Volatility Using RS 
 
 
 
 
4. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide the main empirical findings. Table 2 contains estimates of the 
GARCH-M model for the full sample. The time-varying volatility properties of the univariate 
economic time series are widely analyzed through autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) models. While the univariate GARCH models examine the time-varying nature of 
the economic time series, its multivariate extension, commonly known as multivariate 
GARCH (MGARCH) models, analyses the time-varying conditional cross moments (Khalid 
and Rajaguru, 2006). The departing feature of this technique is that it not only analyses the 
mean return effects of short-selling but also the volatility outcomes of markets though 
GARCH specifications. 
As presented in Ulusoy, Eken, and Cankaya (2011), the GARCH model allows the conditional 
variance to be dependent upon its previous own lags, so that the conditional variance equation 
in the simple case is now: 
 
2
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This GARCH (1,1) model is based on the assumption that forecasts of variance changing in 
time depend on the lagged variance of the asset. An unexpected increase or decrease in the 
return at time t will generate an increase in the expected variability in the next period.2 Table 2 gives 
the pure results from the GARCH-M model, including the mean equation in the form:  
 
tt21t10t
uYY 

       (6) 
where the error term may follow MA(q) terms for the stationarity of the model. This paper 
applies the GARCH-M estimation methodology simply because the classical risk measure of 
standard deviation in financial research may miss the reality, particularly when markets are 
experiencing turmoil. In this case, the connection between return and volatility may break 
down. As for the impact of short selling on market liquidity, the empirical evidence is 
ambiguous. Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) found a positive correlation between short 
interest changes and stock returns in the US market. From their results, they conclude that 
short sellers provide liquidity to the market by shorting into bullish markets and reducing 
short positions in bearish markets. Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) used turnover as a proxy 
for liquidity, and found that there is greater liquidity when short-selling is possible. Gao, Hao 
and Ma (2006) investigated short selling in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and found that 
removing short-sale constraints increased the liquidity of low-priced stocks but not high-
priced ones. Chen and Zheng (2007) applied a time series methodology and found that short 
selling volumes do not Granger-cause market volatility. 
Table 2 
GARCH-M Estimation Results  
 Volumes Quantity 
 
 Return 
 
Return 
 Morning 
 
Afternoon Daily Morning 
 
Afternoon Daily 
Constant -0.052 
(-5.58) 
-0.089 
(-8.06) 
-0.04 
(-6.31) 
-0.038 
(-5.11) 
-0.06 
(-6.78) 
-0.034 
(-5.43) 
SS 7.65 
(6.26) 
2.86 
(8.21) 
4.91 
(6.74) 
1.55 
(5.82) 
5.58 
(6.74) 
9.43 
(5.88) 
       
 Volatility 
 
Volatility 
Constant 0.0003 
(2.22) 
0.0008 
(1.54) 
0.0002 
(2.23) 
0.00025 
(1.89) 
0.0013 
(1.89) 
0.0002 
(2.54) 
Residual(-1) 0.08 
(5.02) 
0.11 
(3.24) 
0.07 
(3.34) 
0.08 
(4.94) 
0.11 
(3.10) 
0.07 
(3.36) 
GARCH(-1) 0.90 
(55.25) 
0.72 
(9.27) 
0.89 
(29.90) 
0.89 
(45.93) 
0.65 
(5.62) 
0.89 
(29.11) 
SS -3.16 
(-1.97) 
3.09 
(2.15) 
-4.46 
(-0.59) 
-1.94 
(-0.50) 
1.11 
(2.06) 
-5.18 
(-0.30) 
       
       
F-stat 5.62 16.2 7.59 4.82 10.49 5.89 
 
Simultaneous estimation of the model for volume and quantity of short-selling using the 
GARCH-M model indicates that in morning sessions, short selling decreases volatility. The 
                                                          
2
 Using the GARCH model it is possible to interpret the current fitted variance as a weighted function of a long-
term average value information about volatility during the previous period and the fitted variance from the model 
during the previous period. 
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inverse happens in the afternoon session. Daily results illustrate that volatility decreases 
overall. The same results are observed as well when quantities are used for short-selling in the 
regression model. In this case, however, the parameters of short-selling in the morning session 
and daily observations are not statistically significant. The GARCH parameters in the model 
for both regressions match perfectly, an indication that there is no collinearity between lag of 
volatility and corresponding short selling variables. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the set of regression results for the YZ and RS measures of 
volatility. The endogenous variables are the computed values of the volatility explained in 
Section III and the exogenous variable is the short selling volume (quantity) in the total 
volume (quantity) of the market transaction. The reason for using such a relative measure of 
the corresponding short selling measure is that YZ and RS are constructed in relative terms so 
that comparison of values would be direct. For all regression models, in the afternoon 
sessions, market volatility increases as the proportion of short selling increases. A 1-point 
increase in this proportion of volumes/quantities, for example, increases the YZ and RS 
market volatilities by 2.07 and 5.08 (2.19 and 6.05) units respectively, and these are all 
statistically significant. Morning sessions have different results and policy implications. 
Short-selling has a negative (positive) effect on YZ (RS), but the results for YZ are only 
statistically significant.  
Table 3 
YZ Estimation Results 
 
 Volumes Quantity 
 YZ 
 
YZ 
 Morning 
 
Afternoon Morning 
 
Afternoon 
Constant 0.00034 
(3.32) 
0.00035 
(0.21) 
0.00042 
(3.76) 
-0.0001 
(-0.05) 
SS/TOTAL -3.09 
(-2.02) 
2.07 
(4.25) 
-4.27 
(-2.88) 
2.19 
(4.50) 
F-Stat 4.10 18.11 43.54 35.34 
     
 
The YZ Estimation results in table 3 demonstrate that as the volume or the quantity of 
SS/Total ratio increases, volatility increases as well in the afternoon sessions. However, in the 
morning sessions, as the SS/Total ratio increases, the YZ volatility decreases both in terms of 
short selling volume and short selling quantity. At this point we should recall the fact that the 
short selling volume in morning sessions is almost double the short selling volume in 
afternoon sessions. This may well be the reason for the negative relationship between the 
SS/Total ratio and YZ volatility. 
Considering that information is accumulated during the time when the ISE is closed, in the 
opening session depending on market sentiment the jump could be in either direction. In the 
opening session, short selling or buying on margin trading is most preferred, due to the fact 
that during the opening, prices are still higher (lower) to short sell (margin trade) them. After 
the first or mega jump in prices, short selling (margin trading) loses its attractiveness, unless 
market sentiment becomes even worse (better). Therefore, generally, after the opening jumps, 
stock prices tend to remain stable with little fluctuation until the end of the morning session. 
Then, in the afternoon session, stock prices tend to fluctuate with wider swings towards 
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closing time when short-sellers start to buy back the stocks that they sold (bought) short in the 
morning session. So, apart from the opening jumps, the fluctuations in the morning session 
remain much smaller than those that occur in the afternoon session. 
Table 4 
RS Estimation Results 
 
 Volumes Quantity 
 
 RS 
 
RS 
 Morning 
 
Afternoon Morning 
 
Afternoon 
Constant 0.0028 
(3.00) 
0.0033 
(6.23) 
0.0033 
(3.29) 
0.003 
(5.00) 
SS/TOTAL 2.38 
(1.72) 
5.08 
(3.20) 
1.62 
(1.18) 
6.05 
(3.78) 
     
F-Stat 2.98 10.24 35.10 27.55 
 
The RS estimation results in table 4 show that as the SS/Total ratio increases, volatility 
increases as well. This movement is stronger in afternoon sessions. When we consider the 
specifications of both of the estimators (the RS historical volatility estimator allows for non-
zero drift, but assumes no opening jumps) and draw a comparison between them, we can 
conclude that YZ is a better estimator for explaining the relationship between short selling and 
volatility. There is clearly an opening jump in the beginning of the morning sessions in terms 
of short selling activity, and according to the YZ estimator results, this activity curbs volatility 
in the morning sessions and triggers it in the afternoons. Taking the daily picture into account, 
it may seem as though opposing forces cancel each other out, and short selling serves the 
market efficiency principle. However, the aim of this paper is to underscore intraday 
activities, and it shows that the relationship between intraday short selling and volatility 
requires further investigation and that there remains room for speculation.   
CONCLUSION 
The activity of short selling has sparked ongoing debate, especially when a negative market 
sentiment predominates, like the crisis which lasted from 2007 to 2009. The debate about 
whether short selling restrictions help improve market efficiency and move prices back to 
fundamentals or whether they increase price volatility has become a widely discussed issue 
around the world. This paper has attempted to approach this debate from a novel perspective.   
 
The evidence that we found supports the view that short selling activities decrease the 
volatility of stock returns on a daily basis. However, we also conclude that the impact of 
intraday activities should be studied in further detail, as there is a notable amount of 
fluctuation in short selling activities on an intraday basis. The two sessions in the ISE 
demonstrate different behavioral patterns in terms of short selling and volatility. Even the 
opening of morning sessions bears unique traits, and we believe that this specific opening 
behavior is deserving of further research.   
The speculative intraday activity within a trading day may result in major fluctuations in 
investors’ returns and profitability, especially during periods of financial crisis such as 
occurred in the years between 2007 and 2009 in which market sentiment was predominantly 
negative. We believe that shorter fluctuations in investor moods in trading days should be 
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observed and analyzed with volatility estimators such as RS and YZ rather than standard 
volatility measures.  
 
In this paper our findings suggest that YZ is a better estimator than RS as it assumes opening 
jumps. The jumps in opening sessions play a crucial role in reflecting market sentiment at the 
start of the trading day. Accumulated information, or the perceptions held by investors from 
the previous day, will be immediately reflected in the market. If these are marked by a 
negative sentiment, this will trigger short selling activities at the start of the morning session, 
leading to the expectation that there will be higher volatility. After the opening jump, the rest 
of the morning session tends to move in a much narrower band, exposing a negative 
connection to volatility.    
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